There is widespread agreement among philosophers that William James's well-known attempt to justify religious faith in ‘The Will to Believe’ is a failure. But despite the fact that James wrote his essay as a reply to the ‘tough-minded’ ethics of belief represented by such thinkers as W. K. Clifford and T. H. Huxley, the reasons commonly given today for rejecting James's position seem to be mostly based on the same principle of intellectual ethics that motivated Clifford and Huxley. Clifford, it (...) may be recalled, maintained that ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. Although this is a rather rhetorical way of stating it, the principle is basically the same one adhered to by most scientists and philosophers who consider themselves rigorous and ‘objective’ thinkers. Even philosophers not associated with the hardheaded modern Anglo-American style of empiricism commonly pledge their allegiance to such a principle. For example, Brand Blanshard holds that the ‘main principle’ of the ethics of belief is that one should ‘equate one's assent to the evidence’ and he then goes on to criticize James, on the basis of this principle, for advocating self-deception and intellectual dishonesty. (shrink)

The reader of Demosthenes can hardly avoid the impression that there was something sadly awry with the Athenian naval system in the two decades prior to Chaeronea. The war in the north Aegean was essentially a naval war, and Demosthenes frequently enough blamedAthen's failure on her lack of preparation. ‘Why do you think, Athenians,… that all our expeditionary forces are too late for the critical moments?…In the business of the war and the preparation for it everything is in disorder, unreformed, (...) undefined. So it is that some news arrives, we appoint trierarchs, we give them the opportunity legally to get others to act in their stead, we consider provision of money, then it is decided that the metics and those “living out” should go on the ships, then again you yourselves, then to allow substitutes, and during these delays^the cause for which we would have been sailing is lost before we have sailed] For we spend the time for action on preparations, but the critical moments for action do not last as long as our dilatoriness and cautious procedures’ . This was spoken in 351 and it is much the same a decade later. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 207-222 [Access article in PDF] Burke Contra Kierkegaard:Kenneth Burke's Dialectic via Reading Søren Kierkegaard G. L. Ercolini Isaac—to his children Lived to tell the tale— Moral—with a Mastiff Manners may prevail. —Emily Dickinson Kenneth Burke employs the term dialectic throughout his works and yet, despite its profuse recurrence, the term remains ambiguous. Much secondary scholarship has focused on Burke and dialectics, and still the (...) term in Burke remains—if not already complicated—cloudy. 1 Part of the difficulty regarding this term stems from Burke's own ambiguity; another part from critics' tendency to rely on Burke's own use and definitions for clarification of this concept. The arguments have been helpful and illuminating, yet Burke's dialectic can be further clarified by going beyond what Burke means by the term by focusing on how he deploys dialectical criticism in his own work. 2 This article focuses on Burke's appropriation of the existential thinker Søren Kierkegaard as a particularly clear and remarkable instance of the operation of Burke's dialectic in his criticism. I maintain that although Burke's reading of Kierkegaard is arguably a misreading, his strategic appropriation of Kierkegaard in A Rhetoric of Motives (1950) not only serves as a clear deployment of the dialectic, but also functions as a foil against which Burke defines his own critical method. Burke's reading of Kierkegaard emphasizes the function of resolution in Burke's critical project.The current literature, although quite informative, does not put Burke's dialectic in sharp focus. Rueckert argues that Burkean dialectics "is really a branch of what Burke was to later call logology, the study of words, of language, of symbol systems" (1994, 14). Heath claims that dialectic "is an analytical tool to help us diagnose perspectives so that we can [End Page 207] examine whether they make sense and consider their implications for social relations" (1986, 162). Crusius contends that, "dialectic for Burke is the study of verbal universes, the disinterested pursuit of a vocabulary's implications" (1986, 24). While Brummett and Crusius show similarity between Hegel's and Burke's dialectic, Heath and Wess distinguish Burke's dialectic from Hegelian idealism and teleological history respectively. 3 Most of the arguments concerning Burke and dialectic focus on "The Dialectic of Constitutions" in A Grammar of Motives (1969), while A Rhetoric of Motives (1962), where Burke identifies humankind as homo dialecticus, is hardly engaged with regard to this concept. 4 Burke's working through Kierkegaard in A Rhetoric of Motives demonstrates Burke's dialectical criticism—thus providing an operational account of Burke's dialectic—and allows for his revelation of the three motives in the realm of rhetoric: the Order, the Secret, and the Kill. 5 And yet, despite this centrality of Fear and Trembling, surprisingly little has been said about Burke's Kierkegaard beyond passing mention. 6Despite editorial advice to the opposite regarding an article that would later become a part of the book, Burke evidently regarded his reading of Kierkegaard as important. Joseph Bennett, editor of Hudson Review, responded as follows to Burke's 1948 submission of the article entitled "Imagery of Killing": "I would like to request that you eliminate Kierkegaard from the article in question, confining it simply to literary exegesis and excluding the philosopher theologian." 7 Although he complied for the article, Burke retained his reading of Kierkegaard in A Rhetoric of Motives. Despite the lack of attention given to it, Burke's engagement with Kierkegaard clearly demonstrates how Burke views ethical criticism as that which resolves opposition, negation, and paradox to a higher order. Burke contra Kierkegaard The section entitled "Order" in A Rhetoric of Motives contains a detailed, twenty-three-page discussion of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling. In this discussion, Burke primarily attacks Kierkegaard for encouraging what Burke enigmatically and elliptically identifies as the "cult of the Kill."Burke's portrayal of Kierkegaard is hardly flattering: at the crescendo of his analysis in A Rhetoric of Motives he claims that thinking such as Kierkegaard... (shrink)

Isolated neutron stars undergoing non-radial oscillations are expected to emit gravitational waves in the kilohertz frequency range. To date, radio astronomers have located about 1,300 pulsars, and can estimate that there are about 2×108 neutron stars in the galaxy. Many of these are surely old and cold enough that their interiors will contain matter in the superfluid or superconducting state. In fact, the so-called glitch phenomenon in pulsars (a sudden spin-up of the pulsar's crust) is best described by assuming the (...) presence of superfluid neutrons and superconducting protons in the inner crusts and cores of the pulsars. Recently there has been much progress on modelling the dynamics of superfluid neutron stars in both the Newtonian and general relativistic regimes. We will discuss some of the main results of this recent work, perhaps the most important being that superfluidity should affect the gravitational waves from neutron stars (emitted, for instance, during a glitch) by modifying both the rotational properties of the background star and the modes of oscillation of the perturbed configuration. Finally, we present an analysis of the so-called zero-frequency subspace (i.e., the space of time-independent perturbations) and determine that it is spanned by two sets of polar (or spheroidal) and two sets of axial (or toroidal) degenerate perturbations for the general relativistic system. As in the Newtonian case, the polar perturbations are the g-modes which are missing from the pulsation spectrum of a non-rotating configuration, and the axial perturbations should lead to two sets of r-modes when the degeneracy of the frequencies is broken by having the background rotate. (shrink)

In REG 73 and 75 I discussed various points connected with the Peace of Philocrates, a number of which have been assailed by M. M. Markle in CQ N.S. 24 in an article entitled ‘The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.’. Time passes, and, although de Ste. Croix in his Origins of the Peloponnesian War , p.105, felt able to declare that ‘a book shortly to be published by M. M. Markle makes a valuable and original contribution to our understanding (...) of the Peace of Philocrates’, and Markle himself confirms that a book is indeed forthcoming, some comment on his preliminary comments may be permitted. (shrink)

The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number (...) presented in the middle of a triplet corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved. Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined by the fluency of the NBT. (shrink)

Background: An ongoing challenge for clinical ethics consultation is learning how colleagues in other healthcare professions understand, make use of, and evaluate clinical ethics consultation services. Aim: In pursuing such knowledge as part of clinical ethics consultation service quality assessment, clinical ethics consultation services can learn important information about the issues and concerns that prompt colleagues to request ethics consultation. Such knowledge allows for greater outreach, education, and responsiveness by clinical ethics consultation services to the concerns of clinician colleagues. Design: (...) This quality assessment project explores consultation requests and follow-up questionnaire responses voluntarily submitted from nurses who requested clinical ethics consultation. We present qualitative data analyzed using content analysis and constant comparison methods to identify key concerns that prompted requests as well as common themes among nurse requestors’ evaluations of what was most important in clinical ethics consultations. Participants and context: A total of 41 nurses requesting clinical ethics consultation and 15 who returned the follow-up questionnaire. Ethical considerations: Our Office of Research Compliance and Quality Improvement determined that our project was not considered human subjects research and so did not require institutional review board approval or exemption. However, efforts were made to avoid any sense of coercion and all data were de-identified prior to analysis. Findings: Our analysis revealed six main categories of issues that prompted nurses’ requests for ethics consultation, as well as unifying themes around nurses’ experiences, advocacy, and family support while caring for patients in the intersections of patients, families, and physicians. Discussion: The insights gained from analyzing nurses’ requests for and responses to clinical ethics consultation may serve as a resource for clinical ethics consultation services seeking to identify, respond to, and educate regarding issues of importance to nurse colleagues and may be a resource for nursing administrators and leadership seeking to identify and address common ethical issues nurses face. Conclusion: Ongoing work on clinical ethics consultation service quality improvement and engagement with our nursing colleagues about their concerns prompting—and their evaluations of—clinical ethics consultation are necessary. (shrink)

The title of this presentation may suggest that the subject is homocystinuria. It is not. Rather, the subject is how our epistemology influences our concept of disease, which in turn determines our ability to help patients.